Trusted computing and mobile systems by Mitchell, Chris
Trusted computing and 
mobile systems
Chris Mitchell
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway
http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm
2Contents
? What is trusted computing?
? The need for trusted computing
? A multiplicity of specifications …
? Application I: Single Sign-On
? Application II: DRM for broadcast
? Application III: Privacy of Personal Information
? Application IV: Co-operation enforcement
3Computer security
? Computer security has a long history, and 
many secure computer systems have been 
produced and sold.
? Almost all of them depend on the assumption 
that the computer hardware will be physically 
secure, and managed by trusted personnel.
? Physical access to the machine will typically 
allow software integrity to be compromised
4Multi-user systems
? Many systems (e.g. Unix, Windows 2K/XP) 
designed to allow users to protect their data 
and resources against other users of same 
machine.
? All based on access control systems.
? Again typically dependent on physical security 
of machine.
5Computer security – external view
? If a (secure) computer digitally signs a 
message, then trust in messages depends on:
– trust in computer software, and
– trust in physical security of hardware (and in correct 
application of security procedures by 
administrators).
? Makes sense in conventional ‘computer 
centre’.
6PC security
? Perhaps an inherent contradiction!
? PCs are not stored in a physically secure 
environment.
? Even though modern versions of Windows 
(and Linux) have multi-user security features, 
users and programs often run as administrator.
? There are many ways that the operating 
system integrity can be damaged.
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8Trusting a PC 
? Today, neither the user of a PC nor a 
communicating party can trust very much at all 
about a PC.
? This is despite major efforts to improve security 
of Windows.
? Anyone with access to the PC hardware can 
modify Windows (e.g. by removing hard disk 
and changing files).
9Trusting a PC – more bad news …
? Even if the user looks after the physical 
security of their PC, there are many other 
threats to system integrity.
? Modern operating systems and applications 
are highly complex and it is almost impossible 
to remove all vulnerabilities.
? Users can easily accidentally run malicious 
software which can damage system integrity.
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Need for trust  I
? User may want to trust the integrity of their PC.
? For example, the PC may be used for:
– managing a bank account,
– performing e-commerce transactions,
– managing personal information,
– …
all of which require user trust in the PC. 
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Need for trust  II
? Third party may want to trust integrity of PC.
? This could be for a variety of reasons, e.g.:
– 3rd party is a bank: PC being used for e-commerce,
– 3rd party is a content provider: PC performing DRM,
– PC performing other security functions (e.g. 
authentication, key management) on behalf of 3rd 
party,
all of which require third party trust in the PC.
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Role of Trusted Computing
? Enables trust in integrity of PC based on 
combination of software and hardware.
? Third parties can measure PC integrity.
? Trusted Computing does not just apply to 
conventional PCs: equally relevant to PDAs, 
mobile phones, broadcast receivers, …
13
On uses of trusted computing
? It seems plausible that such technology –
some proprietary, some standards conformant 
– will be included in most future computing 
devices (PDAs, notebooks, phones, …)
? Many applications for such technology have 
been proposed, most controversially for DRM.
? In this talk we look at a range of possible 
applications relevant in a mobile environment.
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TCG
? Trusted Computing in the sense of this talk 
dates back to late 1990s.
? Consortium of major manufacturers started 
TCPA (Trusted Computing Platform Alliance).
? This has morphed into TCG, the Trusted 
Computing Group. 
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Current position
? May 2003: Operational technical working groups for:
– Future TPM, trusted platform module
– PC specific implementation specifications 
– New TSS, TCG software stack specifications as well as for
– The development of common criteria protection profiles.
? Followed closely by formation of working groups for:
– Server, PDA, mobile phone platform specific implementation 
specifications.
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TCG specifications
? TCG TPM main specification (general platform 
specification) version 1.2:
– Design principles.
– Structures of the TPM.
– TPM commands.
‏ (superseded TCG main specification version 1.1).
? TCG software stack specification version 1.1.
? TCG software stack specification header file.
? TCG PC specific implementation specification version 
1.1.
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Trusted Platforms: TCG definition
? A trusted platform: 
– A computing platform that has a trusted component;
– Usually in the form of built-in hardware which is 
used to create a foundation of trust for software 
processes.
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Trusted Platform functionality (1)
? Trusted platform technologies aim to provide:
– Confidentiality and integrity of application code and 
data;
– Confidentiality and integrity of application code and 
data during storage;
– Integrity of the operating system and underlying 
hardware so that the above properties can be 
satisfied.
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Trusted Platform functionality (2)
? Platform authentication to external entities.
? Trusted path to user ensuring confidentiality of user 
input.
? Secure channels to devices and between applications 
to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of 
inter-application communication.
? Ensure reliability by restricting size of trusted critical 
components:
– Common estimate: 1 security-related bug per 1000 lines of 
code.
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NGSCB
? Next Generation Secure Computing Base
(NGSCB) is Microsoft’s take on Trusted 
Computing.
? Version of Windows that uses trusted hardware 
(e.g. hardware conformant to TCG 
specifications) to build a trusted kernel.
? Allows trusted applications to run under control 
of a trusted operating system, in parallel to 
‘regular’ Windows applications.
22
LaGrande
? Set of enhancements to Intel chip sets 
incorporating everything needed to build a 
Trusted Computing Platform.
? Also provides a potential platform for NGSCB-
enabled PCs.
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Acknowledgement
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Pashalidis.
25
Background
? Desire for an Internet single sign-on solution.
? That is, instead of a user authenticating him/herself to 
multiple service providers (SPs), the user authenticates 
him/herself to an Identity Provider who then provides 
assurances (assertions) regarding the user identity to 
SPs.
? This requirement becomes even more important in a 
ubiquitous computing/mobile environment, where a 
user will not wish to authenticate him/herself to every 
device/service.
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Microsoft Passport
? (Originally) a proprietary SSO solution, which 
also (originally) involved the possibility of 
managing other personal data, all stored on a 
server somewhere ...
? Problems with guardians of end-user privacy, 
including European Commission.
? MS appears to be moving towards a Web 
Services based solution.
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Liberty Alliance
? Consortium set up to provide an open system 
(protocol suite) to support SSO.
? Provides variety of alternative means of 
transferring assertions from IP to SP.
? E.g. using SOAP, web redirection.
? Possible problems, as with any scheme using 
web redirection, if man-in-the-middle attacks.
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WS Federation
? Part of Web Services Security.
? Covers federation of identifiers, and also 
allowed ‘brokering’ of identity/authentication 
services.
? Would appear that it can be used as the basis 
of an SSO scheme.
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TC-based single sign-on
? SSO typically requires an external TTP to act 
as the Identity Provider (IP).
? Why not use TC component to act as the IP, 
which authenticates the user once, and then 
asserts that user is present to other devices?
? Why should other devices believe assertions –
well, by checking out the TC component, and 
knowing that the program making the assertion 
is not compromised.
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Protection of Broadcast Content
? Broadcast content is currently protected by
– Conditional Access (CA) systems that:
? Scramble video
? Manage keys and viewing rights, using proprietary security 
mechanisms
– DVB standards
? Provide an interface to proprietary systems
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Protection of Broadcast Content
? DVB Standards
– Common Scrambling Algorithm ETSI ETR 289
? Used to scramble and descramble services (video)
? Details available to all manufacturers
– Simulcrypt ETSI TS 103 197
? Interface to proprietary systems at transmitter
? Key encryption remains proprietary
? Multiple CA systems in parallel at transmitter
? Common key to scramble services
– Common Interface CENELEC 50221
? Common Interface Modules – PC Cards
? Changes proprietary CA system at receiver
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Protection of Broadcast Content
? DVB Standards 
– Provide a flexible interface to proprietary 
systems
– There are many proprietary systems
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Protection of Broadcast Content
? DVB Compliant Conditional Access (CA) systems 
– CA System Vendor
– Viaccess Viaccess SA
– NagraVision Kudelski
– Videoguard NDS
– Mediguard Canal+
– Mcrypt Irdeto
– PiSys Irdeto
– CryptoWorks Philips
– BetaCrypt BetaResearch
– Conax Telenor
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Limits of current protection 
mechanisms
– New business model
? Delivery of broadcast services to mobile receivers
– Services available from many broadcasters
– Current protection mechanisms
? Designed for relatively static receivers
– Services available from a small number of broadcasters
– Common Interface
? Consumers require multiple PC-Card modules
– Cost, inconvenience, suitability for mobile devices
– Simulcrypt
? Broadcasters install and maintain multiple CA systems
– Cost, maintenance
– Current mechanisms not designed for mobile receivers
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Requirements
? Demonstration of trustworthiness
– Integrity challenge mechanism
– Integrity verification mechanism
? Application protection 
– Secure delivery mechanism
– Secure execution environment
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Application of TCG Trusted Platform 
technology
? Demonstration of trustworthiness
– Integrity metrics
? Authenticated boot – CRTM (Core Root of Trust for Measurement);
? Configuration measurements – PCR (Platform Configuration 
Register);
? Attestation – TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
– current platform configuration
? Application protection 
– Secure delivery mechanism
? Key generation and exchange
– Secure execution environment
? Sealed storage
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Other security and trusted platform 
technology
? Demonstration of trustworthiness
– Integrity verification mechanism
? Certificates and Certification Authorities
? Application protection 
– Secure delivery mechanism
? Encryption, Message Authentication Codes
– Secure execution environment
? Physical separation of trusted and untrusted processes
– Curtained memory – NGSCB, LaGrande
– Compartmentalised OS – NGSCB Nexus
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General Approach to trusted 
download
? Demonstration of trustworthiness
– Authenticated boot;
– Attestation of platform configuration;
– Response to integrity challenge;
– It is the challenger’s responsibility to verify the response and 
determine whether to trust the platform or not;
– Host must not change configuration.
? Application protection
– Key exchange;
– Keys in sealed storage to ensure consistent configuration;
– Message Authentication Codes and Encryption;
– Isolation of applications.
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Protocol requirements
? The protocol must protect against:
– Replay 
? A malicious host could replay attestation information from before 
the system was compromised
– Tampering
? A malicious host could tamper with the integrity metrics before 
transmission to the challenger
– Masquerading
? A malicious host could replace the original integrity metrics with 
data from another system
– Revealing the application
? A malicious host could reveal the application and keys
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Protocol provisions
? The protocol protects against
– Replay 
? The nonce, Rs, protects against replay
– Tampering
? The TPM signature protects the integrity metrics
– Masquerading
? The Certificate of the TPM protects against masquerading
– Revealing the application
? K1, K2, protect the application during transmission
? Sealed storage and isolation protect during execution
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Summary
? Using Trusted Platform technology
– Host is able to demonstrate
? It is running a secure execution environment
– Application provider
?Has confidence that software and data will not be 
tampered
– User
?Has access to a wider range of applications
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TC-based personal information control
? One partial solution to the problem of controlling 
personal information (PI) e.g. location information, is by 
attaching policy information.
? However, such a system needs enforcement.
? Of course, part of that is regulation.
? However, TC can help – that is, if the intended 
destination for PI is a TC-platform, the holder of PI can 
potentially verify the software to which it may be 
passing PI (indeed, it might be obliged to!).
? Currently being studied by Anand Gajparia.
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TC-based co-operation enforcement
? The support of MANETs typically requires co-operation 
by the nodes, e.g. to support routing.
? As commonly discussed, malicious users may replace 
their network software with a ‘selfish’ version, e.g. to 
save battery power.
? TC could help guarantee that a network element is 
running the ‘correct’ software, and hence will not 
behave selfishly.
? (Of course, this requires the communications hardware 
to be part of the TC subsystem.)
